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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Brandon I\J. Crump timely appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction. 
On appeal, Mr. Crump argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Crump was charged, by Information, with trafficking in methamphetamine or 
amphetamine by manufacturing, and felony injury to child. (R., pp.83-84.) Plea 
agreement negotiations ensued and the State offered to reduce Mr. Crump's charge to 
trafficking by attempted manufacturing. (R., p.103.) Mr. Crump filled out a guilty plea 
advisory from which stated that he could receive two to fifteen years for attempted 
trafficking. (R., p.101.) Mr. Crump also signed a pretrial settlement offer which stated 
that he could receive a sentence of "2 fixed - 15 years .... " (R., pp.103-104.) The 
written offer also stated that the State would limit its recommendation to "2 FIXED + 2 
INDETERMINATE," and Mr. Crump was free to make separate recommendations. 
(R., pp.103-104.) 
At the change of plea hearing, the district court told Mr. Crump that he was 
pleading guilty to a charge that carried a minimum sentence of two years fixed and a 
maximum of fifteen years. (09/19/11 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-20.) Later in that hearing, the district 
court told Mr. Crump that the State is "going to recommend a four year max, two fixed 
and two indeterminate. That is a total of four years." (09/19/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.21-23.) 
The district court then asked the State if there was a deal "on a retained jurisdiction 
recommendation here?" (09/19/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.17-18.) The State responded "No, Your 
1 
Honor. It's a fixed two." (09/19/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.19-20.) Ultimately, Mr. Crump pleaded 
guilty to attempted trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine by manufacturing 
and, in return, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charge. (R., pp.88-89, 101, 
103, 106.) 
Mr. Crump then obtained private counsel and filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea, a supporting memorandum, and supporting affidavits. (R., pp.125-126, 130-131, 
133-144.) One of the factual assertions made in support of the motion was that, at the 
change of plea hearing, Mr. Crump did not understand that trafficking by attempted 
manufacturing carries a mandatory minimum sentence of two years fixed. (R., pp.150, 
152.) 
At the hearing on the withdrawal motion, trial counsel argued that the pretrial 
settlement offer only states that attempted trafficking carries a fixed two-year sentence, 
but it did not state that it carries mandatory two-year minimum sentence. (03/08/12 
Tr., p.5, L3 - p.6, L.21.) At the change of plea hearing, trial counsel also argued that 
Mr. Crump was never told that trafficking carried a mandatory minimum two-year 
sentence. (03/08/12 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.8, L.11.) It was also noted that the district court 
which accepted Mr. Grump's plea 1 did not recognize that trafficking carried a mandatory 
two-year sentence because the court asked if there was an agreement on a retained 
jurisdiction recommendation. (03/08/12 Tr., p.17, L.4-p.19, L.9.) Instead of providing 
clarity, the prosecutor stated that it's a fixed two, which added to the confusion. 
(03/08/12 Tr., p.12, Ls. 3-11.) Trial counsel went on to argue that at no time in the 
1 The Honorable George Reinhardt presided over the change of plea hearing and the 
Honorable Steven C. Verby presided over the plea withdrawal hearing. (09/19/11 Tr., 
p.2, Ls.12-15; 03/08/12 Tr., p.1.) 
2 
change of plea hearing did someone tell Mr. Crump that he was pleading guilty to a 
crime which has a two year mandatory minimum. (03/08/12 Tr., p.12, Ls.11-14.) 
Mr. Crump testified at the plea withdrawal hearing, and said that he thought that 
the district court had the ability to order a period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, 
rider), if he pleaded guilty to attempted trafficking. (03/08/11 Tr., p.20, Ls.12 - p.18.) 
Mr. Crump testified that it was on November 21st that he learned from another attorney 
that the district court could not order a rider in his case because attempted trafficking 
carries a mandatory two year sentence. (03/08/12 Tr., p.20, L.19 - p.22, L.10.) On 
cross-examination, Mr. Crump testified that he knew trafficking carried a two-year fixed 
sentence, but when he signed the plea agreement he believed he could get a rider 
because it did not say the sentence was a mandatory two-year fixed sentence. 
(03/08/12 Tr., p.24, L.17 - p.25, L.10.) However, he also testified that his former 
attorney told him he was not eligible for a rider. (03/08/12 Tr., p.35, Ls.10-23.) 
The district court made a factual finding that the written plea agreement "does 
appear to be ambiguous, at least in certain respects." (03/08/12 Tr., p.55, Ls.5-8.) The 
district court then stated that the ambiguity could be clarified by "what I'm going to 
characterize as parts of the oral agreement." (03/08/12 Tr., p.55, Ls.9-12.) The district 
court then made the following factual findings: 
Now, Mr. Crump testified that he knew that he was ineligible for a 
retained jurisdiction. He testified that he knew he was facing a fixed term 
in prison of two years by agreeing to the amended plea agreement. So 
instead of facing five years in prison as a minimum, he was facing two 
years in prison as a minimum. 
I could go ahead and simply state at this point that he did know 
what he was getting into when he entered the plea of guilty. 
(03/08/12 Tr., p.55, Ls.13-22.) The district court also determined that the State would 
be prejudiced if Mr. Crump withdrew his guilty plea because his wife, Mr. Crump's co-
3 
defendant, received a better plea agreement based on Mr. Grump's guilty plea and 
because the State dismissed charges in Mr. Grump's case with prejudice in order to 
induce Mr. Grump's guilty plea. (03/08/11 Tr., p.55, L.22 - p.56, L.22.) The district court 
denied Mr. Grump's motion to withdraw guilty plea, then imposed and executed a 
unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.163, 168-171.) Mr. Crump 
timely appeals. (R., pp.164-165.) 
4 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Crump's motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea filed prior to sentencing? 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Grump's Motion To 
\/Vithdraw His Guilty Plea Filed Prior To Sentencing 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Crump argues that his guilty plea was unconstitutional as he did not 
understand that attempted trafficking in methamphetamine carried a mandatory two-
year minimum sentence. The only issue which needs to be determined on appeal is 
whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the district court's 
factual finding that Mr. Crump understood that he was facing a mandatory minimum 
sentence of two years by pleading guilty to attempted trafficking in methamphetamine. 
Mindful of the applicable standard of review, Mr. Crump argues that the district court's 
factual finding is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Grump's Motion To 
Withdraw His Guilty Plea Filed Prior To Sentencing 
"[TJhe granting or denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is within the 
discretion of the trial court." State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959 (Ct. App. 1990). "A 
threshold question is whether the plea of guilty was knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily made." Id. at 959. The question of whether a plea complies with these 
standards turns on whether: 
(1) the plea was voluntary in the sense that the defendant understood the 
nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) the defendant knowingly 
and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront adverse 
witnesses, and to avoid self-incrimination; and (3) the defendant 
understood the consequences of pleading guilty. 
State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887 (Ct. App. 2002). "[l]f the plea is legally defective, 
relief must be granted." Rodriguez, 118 Idaho at 959. In determining whether the plea 
6 
was voluntary, knowing and intelligent, an Idaho appellate court reviews all of the 
surrounding circumstances disclosed in the record. Huck v. State, 1 Idaho 1 161 
(Ct. App. 1993). "A district court's finding that a plea is voluntary, knowing and 
intelligent is a question of fact which we will not disturb if it is supported by substantial 
evidence." Id. 
Mr. Crump argues that his guilty plea was constitutionally deficient because he 
did not understand the consequences of his plea. Specifically, he argues that he did not 
understand that by pleading guilty to trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine 
by attempted manufacturing as set forth in I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(3), he was subject to a 
mandatory two-year minimum sentence. In order to establish that he didn't understand 
the consequences of his plea, Mr. Crump must establish that he did not understand a 
direct, as opposed to a collateral, consequence of his plea. Huffman, 137 Idaho at 887. 
"A consequence is direct if it presents 'a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect 
on the defendant's range of punishment."' Id. (quoting State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 458, 
460 (Ct. App. 2000)). In Huffman, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of forgery. 
Id. at 886. He argued that his guilty plea was not legal because he did not know that his 
sentences for each count of forgery could be ordered to run consecutively to each other. 
While the defendant ultimately lost his appeal, the Court of Appeals noted that a 
"defendant must be made aware ... of direct consequences of the plea, including 
maximum punishments." Id. at 887. The court went on to hold that a defendant must 
be made aware of the possibility that two sentences could be ordered to run 
consecutively. Id. at 888. As such, a mandatory minimum sentence is a direct 
consequence of a guilty plea. Therefore, the limited issue on appeal is whether the 
district court's factual finding that Mr. Crump understood that his guilty plea would 
7 
expose him to a mandatory minimum two-year sentence is supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. 2 
Mindful of the applicable standard of review and the fact that Mr. Grump's factual 
findings were supported by Mr. Grump's testimony, Mr. Crump argues that in this case, 
the district court's factual finding that Mr. Crump understood the consequences of the 
plea agreement is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Specifically, 
Mr. Crump argues that the guilty plea advisory form and the written plea agreement 
mention that attempted trafficking in marijuana carries a sentence of two years fixed, but 
they do not state that it carries a mandatory minimum sentence of two years. 
(R., pp.101, 103-104.) This distinction is relevant because the Idaho Court of Appeals, 
while interpreting a different subsection of the same statute under which Mr. Crump was 
convicted, concluded that the use of the language "mandatory minimum" precludes a 
district court from either retaining jurisdiction or commuting the sentence to county jail 
time as that language requires the court to impose and execute the mandatory portion 
of the sentence. State v. Brooks, 131 Idaho 608, 609 (Ct. App. 1998). Since 
Mr. Crump was only informed that I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(3) carried a fixed sentence of two 
years, not that a mandatory minimum sentence of two years, he contends that the 
district court's factual finding that he understood the consequences of his guilty was in 
error. 
2 Since the district court also found that the State would be prejudiced because of the 
plea agreement with Mr. Grump's wife, and because it dismissed charges against 
Mr. Crump with prejudice (03/08/12 Tr., p.55, L.22 - p.56, L.22), Mr. Crump is not 
arguing that there was just reason for the district court to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Additionally, the crux of his argument hinged on the assertion that he did not understand 
the consequences of his guilty plea. 
8 
Additionally, the language used by the attorneys at the change of plea hearing 
created so much confusion that the district court, which accepted Mr. Crump's guilty 
plea, thought it had the authority to order a rider after he pleaded guilty. (09/19/11 
Tr., 10, Ls. 7-20, p.13, Ls.4-25, p.14, Ls.20.) If the district court didn't think there was a 
mandatory minimum sentence for attempted trafficking, it is reasonable to believe that 
Mr. Crump did not understand that he was facing a mandatory minimum sentence. 
In sum, Mr. Crump contends that the district court's factual finding that he 
understood the consequences of his guilty plea was not supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. Since this undermines the constitutionality of IVlr. Crump's guilty 
plea. the plea is void, and the prejudice to the State is irrelevant. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Crump respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of 
conviction, reverse the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 
and remand this matter for further proceedings. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 2013. 
---1 
( / (/ {.-------------
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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